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Abstract: 
 
The Calais Jungle has existed in some form for several years. It grew in size tremendously as 
a result of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, but was spectacularly demolished in October 2016. 
When the Jungle was still standing, it was a site of intense violence perpetuated by the local 
police, state authorities as well as French legal systems. Much of the literature that has 
explored the Jungle thus far has rightly depicted it as an unofficial refugee camp, a ‘state of 
exception’, and a site of biopolitical experimentation with distinct ‘camp geographies’. However, 
it is the contention of this paper that while these experimentations occur and fuel the 
precariousness of the site, the Jungle can be seen as a slum, and indeed, that it can be seen 
as a slum of London’s making.  
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Introduction: 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
‘London Calling’ scrawled at the main entrance to the Jungle (Source: Author’s photo, Jan 
2016) 
 
When the Sangatte refugee centre in Calais was closed in December 2002, under the orders of 
Nicolas Sarkozy, who was then French Minister of the Interior, many of the refugees seeking to 
gain entry into the UK formed a number of makeshift camps in the wooded areas around the 
ferry port of Calais (Fassin, 2005; Millner, 2011; Davies and Isakjee, 2015). Since then, these 
disparate camps were systematically cleared by the French police, and corralled into one large 
camp that became known as the ‘Jungle’. As is now well known, it was this larger camp that 
subsequently reached international notoriety through its near-continuous representation in the 
media in 2015 and 2016. During this time, it continually grew in geographical size, number of 
occupants and the intensity of its coverage, despite attempts by the French to dismantle it. 
However, in October 2016 it was violently demolished by the local French police. Given that it 
was never sanctioned as an ‘official’ refugee camp, the people that had called this space home 
existed in a state of juridical limbo, and have since been either dispersed throughout France to 
other makeshift camps away from the prying eyes of the world’s media, or are sleeping rough 
on the streets of Calais. 
 
The Jungle was described in media depictions as ‘Europe’s largest slum’ (Chakelain, 2016), 
given that it had all of the five physical UN-defined characteristics of slum conditions, to a 
greater or lesser degree. According to the UN, a slum must “combine to various extents” 
inadequate access to safe water, inadequate access to sanitation and infrastructure, poor 
structural quality of housing, overcrowding, and insecure residential status (UN Habitat, 2003: 
12). A walk around the Jungle camp in Calais would confirm that all five of these conditions 
were present there. Notwithstanding the urban studies literature debating the analytical utility of 
the term ‘slum’ (Glibert, 2007; Rao, 2006; Roy, 2011), its use has been predominantly applied 
to urban conditions within the so-called Global South. Surely Europe, the global bastion of 
civilisation and Enlightenment could not permit such squalid conditions to exist on its own 
territory? The provocative argument of this paper is that such a site has indeed been allowed to 
exist through the continued development of neoliberal ideologies and their physical 
manifestation, intensification and concentration in the form of the global city1 of London. While 
the Jungle has now been demolished, there are already signs that people are still making camp 
in Calais, while patiently hoping to be able to attempt the crossing to the UK (Bulman, 2016). 
As long as London continues to develop along the contours of a neoliberal ideology, it will 
continue to exacerbate the conditions that caused the growth of the Jungle. 
 
The urban studies literature has comprehensively analysed the formation of slums (see 
Arabindoo [2011], for an overview), with Davis’ (2004; 2006) seminal work encapsulating the 
argument that slums are not the ‘engines of growth’ that many neoliberal commentators would 
have us believe (see De Soto, 2000). Instead, slums are ‘dumping grounds’ for those people 
who have been left out of the increasingly rapid pace of a changing global economy (Rodgers, 
2009). They are informal and marginalised places that are exploited by national and supra-
national institutions as test-sites for neoliberal technologies (Davis, 2004). The Jungle was also 
such a place but the culprit for its informality, marginality and lawlessness, and as a ‘dumping 
ground’ for the thousands of displaced refugees, is not a supra-national financial institution, but 
I argue, the city of London. To put this more precisely, it is my contention that the Jungle was a 
product of the politico-economic processes of power that seek to ossify London’s place atop 
global city hierarchies: London’s ‘global city-ness’. Many of the economic and geopolitical 
processes that originate from the centres of financial and political power in London and other 
global cities have direct repercussions that marginalise groups of people geographically, 
politically and economically (see Sassen, 2001; Massey, 2007). If we are to take seriously the 
thesis of planetary urbanisation (Brenner and Schmid, 2014), then we need to empirically 
explore how the global cities that disproportionately affect this global process exclude, 
marginalise and destroy people and place, as much as they smooth, monetise and produce 
space. This paper intends to do so. In understanding the geographies (near and far) of urban 
marginalisation and how they are marbled through the urbanisation processes that formulate 
and maintain these Leviathanical global cities, we can better prepare, critique and mobilise 
activism to counter it.  
 
London, as one of the world’s foremost global cities, has always marginalised unwanted 
bodies. Back in 1349 during the Black Death, there are records of infected bodies being 
displaced beyond London’s city walls in mass graves creating the first reference to ‘no man’s 
land’ (Lesham and Pinkerton, 2016). These unwanted, unclean and impure bodies were 
expelled from the city, dumped over the walls and removed from the psyche of London. 
Several centuries later, a similar process of ‘expulsion’ of unwanted bodies occurs beyond the 
city walls. The difference today is that those walls have been pushed out further, taking the                                                         
1 A global city is defined as one of the world’s urban centres that are argued to command and control the world 
economy (Sassen, 2001).  
form of the UK national border that separates the wider global city region of London and the 
South East from Continental Europe. Much of the discourse and rhetoric revolving around the 
Jungle rightly pointed the figure of blame at the French systems of asylum, at their police 
tactics and strategies of governance (Ibrahim and Howarth, 2015). However, it is important not 
to be blind-sided by local axioms of broader neoliberal processes (not least for continued 
refugee and asylum-based activism). There are a number of reasons which can explain why 
the Jungle was maintained as a marginal urban space, as a slum of London’s making. These 
include the UK Parliamentary decisions to go to war, the prominence of the London-based 
arms industry, the city’s informal and volatile economic labour markets, and political wrangling 
about the UK’s membership of the EU. 
 
When she famously asked “where does London end?”, Massey (2007: 13), went on to argue 
that “there is a vast geography of dependencies, relations and effects that spread out from here 
[London] around the globe. […] In considering the politics and the practices, and the very 
character, of this place, it is necessary to follow the lines of engagement with elsewhere” (ibid: 
13). Therefore, London as a global city (see Sassen, 2001) extends its influence far beyond its 
borders (wherever and whatever they may be), and impacts directly on places all over the 
world. Hence, I argue that the Calais Jungle was the subject of London’s making; and if the 
current trajectory of London’s rampant increase in neoliberalisation continues, it will reproduce 
a slum-like site on the shores of Northern France and even further afield; indeed any place 
where national borders restrict the free movement of people (such as is currently being 
experienced in Northern Greece [see Squires, 2017]).  
 
Analyses of the Jungle (see Davies and Isakjee (2015), Millner (2011) and Rygiel (2011)) have 
thus far positioned it within the literature on ‘camp geographies’ (Agamden, 1998; Ramadan, 
2013; Minca, 2015), which has given us important insights into explaining and theorising the 
experimental forms of securitization and biopolitics that were perpetrated so violently upon the 
Jungle inhabitants. Yet as Davies and Isakjee (2015: 2) rightly point out, there is more to this 
important observation. For the Jungle also had distinctly urban ‘slum-like’ characteristics that 
were a direct result of (and reaction to) the neoliberal oppressiveness enacted by London’s 
global city processes. The Jungle was used by the UK and French governments as a test site 
for experimental forms of enforcement and control, using buffer zones, temporary shelters, 
controversial weaponry (see Feigenbaum and Raoul, 2016 for details) and violent demolition to 
control the ‘spread’ of the Jungle and the incursion of its inhabitants into the smooth spaces of 
global city commodity flows represented by the commercial freight to and from the UK and 
continental Europe. These are all camp-like characteristics, but because they stem from the 
neoliberal technologies and processes that emanate from London’s continual performance as a 
global city, they rendered the Jungle  - as well as whatever spatial formations might appear in 
coming years as a result of its destruction – into a distinctly ‘slum-like’ place. 
 
This paper is based upon insights gained from a period of volunteer work conducted in the 
Jungle. Over separate periods in the first half of 2016, and during the final demolition, I worked 
on the ‘build crew’ of one of the volunteer groups. This involved going into the Jungle on a daily 
basis, helping to assemble prefabricated housing (‘prefabs’) for the inhabitants. I used this time 
to talk to people (both volunteers and people living in the camp), find out about the how the 
camp was managed and ‘secured’ (by talking to the charity leaders), sample the leisure and 
retail services (regularly eating at the restaurants and in people’s shelters), and to engage with 
the social services being offered by volunteers (such as theatre groups, church services, youth 
clubs and so on). There was also extensive social media communication with the inhabitants 
and longer-term volunteers (via Whatsapp and Facebook messages and groups). As I worked 
in the camp, it became clear that the data that I was ‘gathering’ was being coproduced with the 
other volunteers and the camp inhabitants. To categorise the research as ethnographic or 
participatory action research would be to deny the complexity in which it was situated, as well 
as my own activist agenda. Ultimately, by working, living and socialising with as many of the 
different groups of people as I could (one limitation is that I did not get the chance to speak to 
anyone from the police, for example), I was able to gain an understanding of how everyday life 
in the camp unfolded for the inhabitants, the workings of the NGOs and volunteers and the 
actions of the authorities. In so doing, I was able to extract glimpses of marginalisation, 
neoliberal oppression - in situ in Calais, and from further afield - and experience the brutality of 
everyday life in the Jungle, some of it first-hand. I did not record conversations, but instead I 
wrote up observations every evening in a field work diary. As a result, rather than direct quotes, 
this paper uses vignettes and general observations to colour the theoretical argument; that the 
Jungle’s continual atmosphere of despair (despite brief moments of ‘homeliness’ and 
emancipatory creative action) and eventual material destruction, made it very much a product 
of a global city located a mere 100 miles to the northwest.  
 
The Growth of the Jungle 
 
There are a number of conflicting and inter-related processes that led to the rapid increase in 
the Jungle’s inhabitants. After the closure of a refugee camp in Sangatte in 2002, the 
transformation from a scattering of temporary, impermanent and transient sites in and around 
the Nord-Pas-de-Calais area (Millner, 2011) to a more quasi-permanent site of makeshift 
housing, services and slum urbanism by 2016 was a direct result of the French police’s 
attempts to control the incoming refugees, asylum seekers and migrants who were hoping to 
reach the UK. While these processes are often global and/or geopolitical in their theorisation, 
they are far more local in their articulation. In other words, the political and financial decisions 
that have been made by the networks of neoliberal power brokers to further London’s 
reputation as a ‘world leader’ of economic globalisation and geopolitical power have intricate 
and specific results in Calais. For the sake of clarity, I have distilled them into three interlinked 
processes: securitisation, dispersal and increasing precarity. 
 
Securitisation 
 
The continuing political tensions within ‘Fortress Europe’ particularly between France and the 
UK have frayed relationships with these cross-Channel neighbours (Ibrahim and Howarth, 
2015). This has been even more acute post-Brexit with the proposed amendments to UK-
France border crossing protocols being the subject of the current French presidential elections 
(Cowburn, 2016). The UK has always “been a leading proponent of changes to the asylum 
process” (Bloch and Schuster, 2005: 509) and it continues to be one of the more draconian 
European states when it comes to the efficiency of deportation and the expulsion of ‘unwanted’ 
bodies’ (Iordanova, 2008). The rise of David Cameron’s Conservatism, which has been carried 
forward by his successor Theresa May, has included a determination to loosen the UK’s 
relationship with the EU (Brexit or otherwise) and further intensify and tighten the border 
controls between France and the UK. In November 2015, when she was still Home Secretary, 
Theresa May and her French counterpart Bernard Cazeneuve signed a ‘cooperation 
agreement’ (Anon, 2015) that saw £15 million of funds from the UK being diverted to 
strengthen the police presence in Calais around the refugee camps, as well as to build more 
fences and walls around the ferry and rail terminals. In March 2016, Cameron announced an 
“additional £17 million in priority security infrastructure in Calais to assist the work of the French 
police”. And again, just before the clearance in October 2016, the UK Home Secretary, Amber 
Rudd, delivered a speech to Westminster in which she stated that up to £36 million would be 
spent on securing the border between France and the UK. Additionally, in July of that year, the 
UK government advertised an £80 million contract for a private security firm to conduct 
“security services to support its operational activities in the ports of Calais, Dunkerque and 
Coquelles in Northern France” (Ted, 2016: n.p.). The increase of the Jungle has catalysed a 
great deal of this spending, but it is clear that there is a broader policy of intense border 
securitisation emanating from the decision-makers in Westminster.  
 
During my time in the Jungle, the most observable and formidable form of securitisation was 
the presence of heavily armed police personnel patrolling the borders of the camp and the 
main arterial roads going in and out - they would often stop and search vans and lorries that 
they suspected of bringing in provisions or building materials. However, on top of the highly 
visible police, a host of other agents were involved in the ‘management’ of the camp, from local 
judges to the mayor of Calais, from local NGOs to judges and personnel from the national 
home office – together making up the ‘préfecture’; and they all received funds from the UK 
government. Specifically, the money went towards buying weaponry for the French police, 
providing legal support to local politicians, building fences and walls along the motorway and 
paying for extra police shifts (Anon., 2016; Ted, 2016).  
 
With his desire to redress the UK’s relationship with the EU before the Brexit referendum, 
Cameron had focused on the restriction of movement across borders for migrants and asylum 
seekers, as well as discussions around the limit to the amount of welfare they would be able to 
claim if they made it to the UK. In a post-Brexit political landscape, the new Prime Minister 
Theresa May, has continued to tinker with policies that are intensifying the border. For 
instance, the government has (so far) refused to let unaccompanied children into the UK, 
despite the fact that a vote in Westminster aiming to keep them out ended up being overturned 
under intense public pressure in May 2016. Furthermore, in September 2016, £2 million of UK 
money was spent building the so-called ‘Great Wall of Calais’, a stretch of 13-foot high 
concrete that separates the area where the Jungle was from the adjacent motorway. Despite 
the clearance of the October 2016, the erection of the fence continued, and it was finished in 
December 2016. The permanence of a physical barrier despite the Jungle’s clearance, and the 
increasingly large sums of UK money on securitisation is an indication of how much political will 
there is to sure up the border and protect the smooth transport of goods and services that swell 
London’s economy. All the while, the London-based media narratives have provided the 
justifying rhetoric by espousing dehumanising and xenophobic narratives towards those in the 
Jungle, which only served to reinforce the ‘otherness’ and inhumanity of the Jungle’s 
inhabitants (Ibrahim and Howarth, 2015)2. 
 
The physical and political intensification of these border controls was evident in my visits to the 
Jungle. When driving off the ferry or the train, I was immediately directed onto the main road, 
with the fences immediately looming up either side. Built in white mesh and around 6 meters 
tall, the fences are laced with razor wire. Alongside the stretch of motorway that bordered the 
Jungle camp, police vans lined up bumper to bumper. With their blue lights flashing, they were 
sometimes 25 strong, forming another highly visible and securitised barrier to the main arterial 
routes of the transportation terminals. On the main roads into the camp, police barricades were 
established, sporting highly militarised aesthetics: black armour plated shoulder pads, heavy 
duty helmets, tear gas cannons strapped over their shoulders, pistols fastened to their thighs.                                                         2 See Elgot and Taylor (2015) and Mason and Perraudin (2016) for a few of the more moderate phrases used in 
the UK press. 
Driving through the border points at the ferry terminals on both sides, my car was thoroughly 
searched, and I was questioned about where I was going. When I would explain that I was 
going to the Jungle to volunteer, I was subject to further questions about exactly what I was 
doing, and which charity I was attached to. This was a process that many of the other 
volunteers with whom I spoke had experienced, particularly those driving vans, or those whose 
physical appearance was non-Caucasian. This intense tightening of the border created a 
bottleneck through which fewer and fewer refugees and asylum seekers were able to pass, and 
hence led to the growth of the Jungle. 
 
Dispersal 
 
Secondly, the processes that are forcing people to ‘disperse’ from the Middle East have only 
increased over the past few years. The UK government’s vote in the House in December 2015 
to carry out air strikes in Syria was one of the latest political moves that served to increase the 
precarity of civilians in one of the already most volatile areas in the world. In July 2016, the 
Chilcot Report detailed how over a decade earlier in 2003, the UK government entered the Iraq 
War based on extremely flimsy military intelligence, and it critiqued the fact that relevant 
Whitehall departments were unprepared for the post-invasion occupation, creating the 
conditions for a large power vacuum in the region (Ali, 2016). This exacerbated the ‘permawar’ 
in Middle Eastern countries (Graham, 2004), which has only intensified and spread since, 
pushing people out of the area and into Europe, via perilous and often fatal boat journeys 
across the Mediterranean Sea. The rise of ISIS (which has itself been argued to be a relational 
product of the West’s continued ‘war on terror’ [see Kundnani, 2014]) and the violence that they 
have inflicted towards a number of particular ethnic and religious groups has also precipitated 
the departure of millions of anguished people from the region.  
 
The materials of warfare, the weaponry, military strategy and the legal frameworks for justifying 
the war (so called ‘lawfare’ [Jones, 2016]) are intertwined with the financialised landscapes into 
what is now described as the ‘military-industrial’ complex. The economic justifications for an 
arms industry that creates jobs, economic growth and maintains world peace are often part of 
the narrative from government officials. And like any other major international industry, 
because London is a global city and hub of financial globalisation, it is one of the nerve centres 
of the military-industrial complex. To illustrate this, one need only to point to the Canary Wharf-
based institutions, such as HSBC, that have been implicated in the cluster-bomb funding 
controversy of 2010 (Taylor, 2011). Many UK arms manufacturers have their headquarters in 
London, such as BAE Systems, but there are also many international law professionals that 
have provided the legal justification for the UK government to undertake military operations, 
and who are also based in London (Jones, 2016). Of course, the global landscape of finance, 
the arms industry and international law firms connect the world’s global cities in a planetary 
network of capitalist production (Taylor, 2004). New York, Paris, Frankfurt, Moscow and other 
global cities around the world are equally complicit in the perpetuation of the ‘permanent war 
economy’ (Jones and Smith, 2015) and the subsequent displacement of millions of people. 
However, London’s concentration of military-focused politico-economic practices is particularly 
acute given the intense ties, both geographical and personal, between the government and 
industry (Merrifield, 2014). A telling example of this is the Defence Security and Equipment 
International exhibition (DSEI), which is held every two years and is the world’s largest arms 
industry fair: it is held at the London Royal Docks3. London’s desire to be a global financial,                                                         
3 In the year’s when the exhibition does not take place the Farnborough Air Show which is held, and it is the 
second largest defence trade exhibition. Farnborough is a small military town about 25 minutes by train from 
legal and service-providing hub therefore is highly culpable in the continuing war in the Middle 
East.  
 
I spoke to several young men who had fled across Europe as a result of the violence 
perpetuated against their families. One in particular spoke of how he witnessed his parents and 
older brother killed in an explosion at this home in Singar, Iraq. Of course, this is not a unique 
story, and several other young men recounted the horrors of ISIS’ brutal regime and their 
desperation to escape, often resorting to paying large amounts to local people traffickers to get 
them to Europe. These factors of dispersal only increase the number of people shunting up 
against the increasingly solid borders to the UK, swelling the need for more ‘durable’ 
accommodation, hence the perpetuation and spread of the Jungle in the final years before it’s 
violent demolition.  
 
Increasing Precarity 
 
Like many other slums around the world, inhabitants are drawn by the perceived work 
opportunities in ‘the big city’, and the draw of London has been the most important factor in the 
Jungle’s existence. The main reason for which it has come to exist - and the reason why many 
people are staying in Calais even after its demolition - is because people are looking to get to 
the UK, with London the overwhelmingly preferred option (exemplified by the graffiti in Figure 
2). Many have either refused asylum or the offer of work and shelter in France, Germany or 
any of the other states they have passed through, precisely because they want to be reunited 
with friends or family living in the UK. However, on top of the obvious physical barrier of the 
Channel, an additional legal barrier exists as a consequence of Britain not belonging to the 
passport-free Schengen zone. As a result, the final border between France and the UK 
becomes possibly the biggest obstacle in an already highly difficult and lengthy journey.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
‘London my dream’ painted on an MSF provided tent in the Jungle (Source: Author’s photo, 
Feb 2016) 
 
 
One of the key socio-economic conditions of global city formation is the polarization of work 
into super-rich financial elites and a chronically low-paid and precarious underclass of casual 
labourers (Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991; Sassen, 2001; Massey, 2007). In London, the 
casualisation of work has accelerated due to the onset of neoliberal labour technologies such 
as zero hour contracts, increased outsourcing to freelancers, employment agencies and 
project-based temporary work (Mould et al., 2014). This has meant a wider spread of 
employment opportunities, but all at much lower pay and with less secure and formal working 
arrangements. These jobs are attractive to migrant workers, refugees and traffickers as their 
bureaucratic and ‘official’ oversights are very low or non-existent, effectively annihilating the 
barriers to entry. However, the result is exploitation, racism and institutional prejudice 
(McDowell, 2009; Dyer et al., 2015).  
 
The socio-political fabric of cities is also an important factor in the destination of migrants and 
asylum seekers (see Schiller and Çağlar, 2009). London’s multiculturalism and ethnic diversity 
are also major contributing factors which explain the attempts to reach the city, either as                                                                                                                                                               
London Waterloo, and it is arguably part of the Global City Region that is London and the wider South East of 
England.  
somewhere to settle, or as a base to ‘acclimatise’ to life in the UK before moving on to another 
city or region. Work on migration studies in relation to urbanisation has articulated the tensions 
that exist in areas of high immigration, which often realise cultural conflicts and political 
marginalisation. For example, Millington (2012: 7) has argued that the ‘outer-city’ is often the 
subject of political disinvestment which is “emerging as [an] unlikely meeting points for ‘key 
workers’, immigrants seeking access to the city”. Focusing on Southend as a fringe ‘outer-city’ 
of London, he articulates how such ‘meeting points’ go on to be characterised by “racist 
narratives… and violence” toward immigrants (ibid.: 16). Even though this is not always the 
case, the inward migration of people from the Jungle to London can thus be met with some 
resistance. The media ‘furore’ around the 14 children that arrived in Croydon from the Jungle in 
October 2016, immediately prior to the final demolition, is a striking example of this. Several 
commentators made claims that the youths appeared to be older than they stated and that they 
were likely to be like adults (see, see Dominiczak and Swinford, 2016). Notwithstanding the 
miniscule numbers involved and the racist overtures of such claims, it highlights how the 
inward migration of unwanted and unnamed bodies into the social fabric of the global city is 
often met with resistance, xenophobia and oppression. 
 
These three inter-related processes of securitisation, dispersal and increasing precarity go 
some way to explaining the ‘push’ factors displacing people from the war-torn areas of the 
Middle East, the ‘pull’ factors of London’s precarious and informal labour market, and the 
securitisation of the borders. Together, they resulted in the production of the Jungle that was 
subsequently depicted in the world media throughout 2015 and 2016. These processes also 
had particularly violent consequences that exacerbated the Jungle as a space that was 
interstitial, precarious and experimental4. But it was also a space in which the combination of 
local and London-based actors deepened the vulnerability of inhabitants; a vulnerability that 
continues as they look to find alternative shelter now that the Jungle, their one-time home, has 
been so violently demolished. 
 
Violence of the Jungle 
 
What follows are some notes that I typed up after a particular encounter on the morning of 
January 29th, 2016:  
 
I paced up the ‘main street’ of the Jungle carefully, my camera clutched in my hand as I 
navigate the large mud puddles. The air is wet and cold, but windy enough to remove the 
perma-sillage of human waste from my nostrils. It’s roughly 10am, and the road is relatively 
deserted, certainly nowhere near as bustling as it is later in the afternoon and early evenings. 
Some of the refugees stride over mud to reach a standpipe, some huddle into their jackets as 
they pace aimlessly around. I pass a MSF worker and a lorry driver, arguing about where to 
deposit a skip. Once I pass beyond their argumentative din, I’m accosted by a young man, 
“hello my friend” as he grabs my hand to shake it. My immediate thought is to try and brush him 
off, but soon a second man comes up to me, brandishing one of the construction knives that I 
had used previously on the builds. He presses the blade to my stomach, “phone, phone” the 
knife-wielder says calmly. The other assailant pats my coat pockets. My eyes fixed on the 
knife, all I can utter is “no phone, no phone”, and fumble in my jean pockets for some Euro 
notes I knew I had; €50 in total. I hand them over, and they disperse. I breathe. I continue                                                         
4 Drawing on Butler’s (2006) broad conceptualisation of violence as a constant ‘derealisation’ of the Other, the 
Jungle is  “interminably spectral” (ibid.: 33-34), in that for the préfecture and other ‘managers’, the refugees are 
neither alive nor dead, they are unnamed bodies, unstable and precarious. Violence therefore, according to Butler, 
is the continual act of making a subject precarious, of enacting precarity. 
walking up the road, away from my parked car. I bemoan my bad luck, but feel grateful I’d held 
onto my DSLR camera and my phone. I carry on my task of photographing the container 
housing. On the way back, I notice the MSF worker banking the truck into the spot where she 
wants to skip to be, and as I look, the same men accoster me again. This time, they look more 
determined, although somehow skittish. One man grabs me, but I am able to continue my 
direction, pulling his rather slender frame along as I try to make my way back to my car, a mere 
60m-dash away around the corner. The man with the knife again thrusts the knife toward me, 
but clearly being careful not to make contact. I had wedged my phone in the breast coat 
pocket, and my SLR into the zipped compartment inside the coat. The men pad my jean 
pockets, “phone, phone”. I start my rebuttal, but this time, realising I had no more cash to offer, 
my tone was clearly stooped in panic. The men sense my diminishing guard, and press harder 
with the knife against my stomach. I recoil, able to resist their grips on my shoulders, but they 
continue to press. While my eyes were fixated on the knife, I sensed their gaze flitting from me 
to what was going on around them. They suddenly fall back, for reasons I do not know 
(although a car coming down the road surely the culprit). I don’t wait to find out, and sprint (as 
much as you can in wellington boots across a quagmire) toward my car, bundle in and speed 
off, only to catch a glimpse of the attackers in my rear view mirror, banging on the boot. I 
accelerate away, leaving them to vanish in my mirror, as I make my way on the motorway slip 
road.  
 
Muggings happen in cities all over the world every day and my encounter with these people 
was very mild compared to the horrific and violent encounters that can happen daily in urban 
settings. What it exemplifies is the desperation of the inhabitants of the Jungle, which only 
increased as the site became more crowded and unstable in the run up to its demolition in 
October 2016. Looking back, the young men (possibly children) who accosted me seemed to 
be constantly checking over their shoulders and looking around anxiously. I recounted this 
story to some of the longer-term volunteers, who said that muggings like this were rather 
uncommon. In large part, this is because such opportunists fully realised that if other more 
‘senior’ inhabitants of the camp became aware that they had mugged visitors to the Jungle, 
they would have been severely punished (I was told that residents did not steal from volunteers 
– it was possibly because those in question had believed me to be a journalist that I was 
targeted on this occasion). When victims have reported crimes to the police, the response was 
usually swift and often violent, giving the police an excuse to act in order to be seen doing 
something. As a result, even a minor theft was always deemed a justifiable reason to intervene. 
Needless to say that as I was aware of this fact, I did not report the events of the day to the 
police.  
 
The violence that I experienced, and the far more brutal and oppressive kind that the police 
have been all too eager to enact, was part of everyday life in the Jungle (see also Davies and 
Isakjee [2015]). By being both physically and legally violent, the London-financed préfecture 
was enforcing precarity in what was no doubt a deliberate technology of instability (Butler, 
2006). The Jungle’s multi-scalar precariousness and non-status as an unofficial camp makes it 
an urban space for which to ‘test’ methods of societal control and enforcement. Despite not 
being an official ‘camp’, the Jungle did in some part display what Minca (2015) has called 
‘camp geographies’. He notes that refugee camps are ‘biopolitical laboratories’, used as 
experimental political technologies of biometrics, surveillance and legal tenure. The 
experiments that take place in the vast number of camps across the world (detention, refugee, 
concentration, military and so on) influence global processes of mobility and control and Minca 
argues that “we are all indeed affected by the presence of camps” (2015: 80). He uses the 
example of how the biopolitical experimental of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay brought the 
aesthetics and sensibilities of the concentration camp ‘back home’, specifically into the 
increased securitisation practices in transportation terminals. Nevertheless, while some of 
these camps are indeed spaces of experimentation, others can also be spaces of home, 
however precarious that home may be. When researching Palestinian camps in Lebanon, 
Ramadan (2013: 74) argues that; 
 
“Assemblage[s] of buildings, homes, people, institutions, social relations and 
practices that have grown up from a gathering of destitute refugees sheltering 
in tents. The camps are spaces in which social formations from Palestine are 
reassembled and sustained in exile, and in which cultures and traditions from 
Palestine are recreated and performed”. 
 
He argues that these camps are “like a slum or shanty town” (ibid.: 73) because of their 
liminality and semi-formality. However, rather than being ‘like’ a slum, the Jungle is a slum 
precisely because such ‘liminality’ becomes an intrinsic consequence of London’s neoliberal 
urbanism, as well as the broader processes of inter-continental migratory patterns. There were 
multiple instances of biopolitical control, but despite this oppression, more gentile spaces of 
home were ‘sustained in exile’ (ibid.; see also Mould [2017]). The ‘controlling’ processes often 
had more specific connotations with London’s urbanisms that were at the same time slum-like, 
but also stemming from circulatory aesthetics of contemporary neoliberal urban imaginaries. 
Nowhere was this more evident than through the imposition by the French government of 
standardised and highly recognisable white shipping containers as living modules for residents 
(see Figure 3).  
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The white container living quarters within the Jungle (Source: Author’s photo, Feb 2016) 
 
 
The whitewashed façades of the containers, wired perimeter fence(s), patrolling security 
guards with attack dogs and overtly detention camp aesthetics dominated the visual landscape 
of the Jungle (indeed, they are the only remainders of the Jungle on the site today – perhaps 
ominously maintained for further use in the future). Information about how these were assigned 
to residents was near-impossible to obtain from the préfecture, but to those Jungle inhabitants 
who did get to live in them, containers did offer warm, clean and semi-permanent shelter. What 
is known is that in order to gain access to these structures, residents had to provide biometric 
data in the form of a palm print. The people with whom I spoke were highly suspicious of these 
arrangements, regarding them as a form of asylum databasing technique by stealth, and they 
were worried that these could potentially hinder their chances of gaining legal entry in the UK. 
 
It has been argued that the use of containers more broadly is symbolically charged (Klose, 
2015). Indeed, after deindustrialisation, containers have been used in the political imaginary as 
technologies of concealment and temporariness. One might add that they have also become 
synonymous with the prevailing neoliberal epoch of hyper-mobility of goods and people. The 
housing of the inhabitants in containers in the Jungle therefore created an imaginary that feeds 
into a mass-media narrative. A narrative that positioned these structures as only a temporary 
part of the landscape, and that the people they contained would soon be moved elsewhere 
(which, of course, turned out to be the case). Indeed, as Klose (2015: 308) notes, containers 
evoke the narrative of “I’ll be gone soon! Don’t worry, this is just a temporary installation”.  
 
The container aesthetic and its alignment with new forms of temporary urbanism have roots in 
London. The Boxpark shopping mall in Shoreditch is credited with being one of the first ‘pop-
up’ malls (Mould, 2015; Harris, 2015) to use containers as a temporary fix in the post-
recessionary London urban landscape. Since then, the container as a temporary use in 
housing, office space and retail has exploded all over the world. As a result, it was possible to 
catch a glimpse of the spectre of London’s creative urbanism over the Jungle’s aesthetics, but 
in ways that denoted the industrialised storage of unrecognised people (Dyer, 2016), rather 
than an innovative commercialised venture.  
 
In addition to physical violence, the legal infrastructure of the préfecture (again, funded largely 
by the UK Home Office funds; see Anon [2016]) enacted precarity through the local court in the 
city of Lille. On many occasions, cases were heard that pertained to site clearances, the 
legality of the shops in the Jungle and the fate of the children living there. Many of the 
clearances - including the final one - were decided upon in this court, and these were often 
labelled as ‘humanitarian clearances’. However, these were sadly often anything but 
humanitarian, and what were supposed to be ‘orderly demolitions’ often escalated into violent 
clashes and arson attacks. Ultimately, the London-financed legal structure kept the inhabitants 
in a state of fear and instability with these sporadic clearances, forcing them ultimately to 
accept the alternative living arrangements in the containers, or deportation to other camps 
elsewhere in Europe after the final demolition in October 2016. 
 
One of the first major legal procedures was to the decision to create a buffer zone between the 
camp and the motorway, which was initiated shortly before my visit to the site in January 2016, 
and which continued while I was there (see Figure 4).  
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE  
Two policemen walk across the newly created ‘buffer zone’ between the camp and the 
motorway (Source: Author’s photo, Jan 2016) 
 
 
The court decided that due to the increased attempts by camp inhabitants to gain access to 
UK-bound vehicles on the motorway by scaling the fences, they would impose a 100-metre 
buffer zone between the motorway’s edge and the camp. In effect, they created a form of ‘no 
man’s land’, which at its most visceral is a “violent encounter of the human body with the 
materialities of the earth” (Lesham and Pinkerton, 2015: 50). This was made all the more 
evident through the use of large construction machinery that reengineered the entire 
landscape. After evicting all who were resident in this zone, the authorities proceeded to 
‘flatten’ the land, creating a vantage point that allowed for an increased panoptic vision of the 
site and its residents. Looking at the engineered vista in Figure 5 (the photo was taken atop the 
large embankments that borders the Jungle created by the buffer zone), it is easy to see how it 
facilitated the police’s ability to spot people leaving the Jungle and attempting to get access to 
the motorway (on the right of the picture). This ‘violent encounter’ between the human body 
and the material of the earth created an interstitial zone, one that encircled almost the entire 
camp, ensnaring people and thereby exacerbating the precarity of the site. 
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
A lone child wonders across the buffer zone (Source: Author’s photo, March 2016) 
 
 
Before creating this no man’s land, the préfecture gave people approximately four days notice 
in order to move any shelters or structures that they were occupying within this newly 
established ‘buffer zone’. In a scramble to move shelters, many of the volunteer and inhabitant 
groups ceased their daily activities and set about moving shelters and prefabs to alternative 
areas of the Jungle en masse. Lorries, low-loading vans, carts, forklift trucks and teams of 
people lifting were all used to transport assembled prefabs across the camp. Without the 
collective mobilisation of the refugees and the volunteers, bulldozers and diggers would have 
destroyed these shelters, which would have no doubt incurred further violent clashes with the 
police. Moreover, according to the court’s decision, three particular structures of significant 
social value for the residents were to remain untouched during the enforcement of the buffer 
zone: a church, a mosque and a school. These institutions, along with other ‘social services’ 
that included a theatre, a shelter for women and children, a youth club, and even a boxing gym, 
formed the heart of the ‘little city’ (a title used by some of the inhabitants that I worked with 
when referring to the Jungle). These, along with other entrepreneurial activities such as shops, 
restaurants, hot showers and barber shops, provided an atmosphere of urbanity to the Jungle 
that gave people a political constituency (Ramadan, 2013) within the site – this may indeed 
have been fragile, but it offered glimpses of normality. However, without warning and 
notwithstanding the promises, during that first major clearance in January, the church and the 
mosque were bulldozed. In March, during another large clearance, the hut that provided legal 
services and asylum advice was demolished. This left the larger church isolated so was 
subsequently dismantled. Such seemingly indiscriminate violence toward important home-
making institutions can be seen as yet another system of the Jungle’s control by London-
financed infrastructures of oppression. Refusing the inhabitants structures that pertain to a 
more ‘homely’ sense of place is a domicidal strategy (Porteous and Smith, 2001; Nowicki, 
2014), one that constantly maintained a state of vulnerability for the inhabitants of the Jungle, 
and one that is befitting of the broader relationship between a major urban centre and its 
slums. 
 
The Jungle: A Slum of London 
 
Studies of the Calais Jungle thus far in the literature have been keen to make reference to what 
Minca (2015), drawing on the work of Agamben (1998), has called ‘camp geographies’ (Davies 
and Isakjee, 2015; Millner, 2011; Rygiel, 2011). The Jungle, as a site of biopolitical violence, 
can certainly be characterised as a ‘state of exception’, and arguably “is … a true political 
technology, determining the actual practices of citizenship today, and governing motion, 
governing life in important ways” (Minca, 2015: 81). Seeing how the securitisation of the camp 
has become normalised within media rhetoric renders these assertions largely accurate. 
However, to depict the Jungle only as a ‘camp’ underplays its specific slum-like and distinctly 
urban characteristics (Ramadan, 2013). There is rich humanitarian work conducted by official 
NGOs with an army of independent volunteer workers that provided spaces of radical sociality 
and ‘commoning’. They acted as ‘safe spaces’, at least temporarily safe from the constant 
oppression and violence enacted by the préfecture (Mould, 2017). Camp inhabitants adapted 
the various services that the volunteers brought in, and even created semi-permanent retail 
and leisure facilities. They brought their own unique skills too, combining them with the material 
provisions from the volunteers and donations to create their own services, activities and 
instances of urbanity (see Ramadan, 2013). For example, the London-based ‘Good Chance 
Theatre’ was erected in Calais and provided theatrical, performance and artistic pursuits for the 
refugees (BBC, 2016a). In the Jungle, this performance space provided a creative outlet for the 
inhabitants, with music, dance and theatre performed daily, often political in their content, with 
particular critique toward Westminster, UK politicians and corporations. In June 2016, this 
theatre was dismantled and exhibited as part of the South Bank Centre’s Festival of Love 
program (see Figure 6), bringing (or perhaps co-opting?) the slum aesthetics of the Jungle, 
particularly its subversively creative aspects, back into the neoliberal heartland of London’s 
creative infrastructure.  
 
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
The Good Chance Theatre once in the Jungle, re-erected at London South Bank’s for the 
‘Festival of Love’ (Source: Author’s photo, July 2016) 
 
 
Massey’s (2007) poignant question from the introduction of this paper needs to be asked once 
more: Where exactly does London end, if it does at all? As a global city it continues its 
dominance as a centre of economic power through the intensification of its international 
financialised practices. Where does it end? In the era of planetary urbanisation (Brenner and 
Schmidt, 2014), London has no ‘end’, only sites of marginality, lack, precariousness and 
informality that are systematically created and maintained through London’s part in global 
politico-economic processes. It is impossible to isolate London from the boarder suite of 
planetary urbanisation processes neoliberal or otherwise. As I have argued elsewhere (Mould, 
2016; see also Wachsmuth, 2014), it is ontologically impossible to isolate the concept of the 
city from broader suite of planetary urbanisation processes, so to think of the city of ‘London’ as 
a coherent whole that is solely responsible for the atrocities of the Jungle would be counter to 
this theoretical position. Instead, this paper has explored the empirical realities of how the 
urbanisation processes that constitute London’s ‘global city-ness’ also constitute slum-like 
spaces of marginality, biopolitical experimentation, violence, informal entrepreneurialism, 
precarity and subversive creativity. Far from being overused and devoid of analytical meaning 
(a la Gilbert, 2007), the term ‘slum’ has the ability to provide a “visibility for certain histories and 
the landscapes of politics” (Rao, 2006: 228). The Jungle (and whatever will take its place in the 
coming years) was a slum of London because, as this paper has contended, they were woven 
together historically, politically, socially, culturally and economically. As long as London 
continues to be one of the primary and most efficient coagulations of neoliberal planetary urban 
processes within a broader geopolitical framework of European instability and Middle Eastern 
permawar, there will always be a site in Northern France that acts as the ‘dumping ground’ for 
un-named and unwanted bodies. Sangatte, the Jungle and whatever socio-spatial patterns 
eventually replace it: there will always be a site of oppression and structural violence. It will 
always be the site of London’s slum. 
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FIGURES: 
 
 
Figure 1: “London Calling” – Banksy’s graffiti on the entrance to the Jungle (source: author’s 
photo) 
 
 
Figure 2: “London my dream” graffiti on a tent in the Jungle (source: author’s photo) 
 
 
Figure 3: The white living containers, and their manicured landscaping sit in contrast to the rest 
of the Jungle (source: author’s photo) 
 
 
Figure 4: The construction of the ‘buffer zone’ between the camp and the motorway (source: 
author’s photo) 
 
Figure 5: A child traverses the buffer zone (Source: Authors photo) 
 
 
Figure 6: The Good Chance Dome Theatre at the London’s South Bank Centre (Source: 
Author’s photo)  
